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LOAN WORKOUTS, SUPERFUND, AND LENDER
LIABILITY: DE MINIMIS SETTLEMENTS -
THE "MAGIC BULLET"?
by
TIMOTHY J. SZUHAJ
INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, hazardous waste problems have come to the forefront of
the political and social agenda. The Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund) 1 has been a prim ary force
in shaping these agenda. CERCLA, through a scheme of strict, joint and several
liability,2 strives to "cleanup" hazardous waste sites while placing the costs of such
remedial efforts on the polluter.' The effects of CERCLA on all aspects of
contemporary society is well documented.4 Although CERCLA's goals are gener-
ally accepted as appropriate and beneficial, the legal paradigm created by the Act has
clashed--or at least conflicted-with other areas of existing law.5 Traditional
creditors'practices with respect to their debtors is one such area which CERCLA has
affected.
CERCLA's magnanimous pursuits have infringed upon a preexisting eco-
nomic infrastructure. Contemporary commercial practices have generated an
extensive network of financial options, and both a creditor and a debtor are almost
always at the center of this financial web. 6 Lenders have often enjoyed wide
"Associate, Clark, Ladner, Fortenbaugh & Young, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. B.A. Indiana University,
1987; J.D. Villanova University School of Law, 1991. The author wishes to express his gratitude to
Professor John M. Hyson for his advice and encouragement.
'Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation andLiabilityAct §§101-175, 42U.S.C. §§9601 -
9675 (1988) [hereinafter CERCLA].
21d. §107(a). Fora discussion ofCERCLA's liability scheme, see infra notes 53-67 and accompanying text.
3 See, e.g., United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 , 1553 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615,622 (D.N.H. 1988); United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298, 1304 (E.D. Mo.
1987); United States v. Conservation Chem. Corp., 628 F. Supp. 391, 404 (W.D. Mo. 1985); City of
Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1142-43 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
'See, e.g., UN= STAES ENVIRONmENTAL PRorEcrON AGENcy, Mssfmo nE FvmoNmENrAL C:ALLNG:
EPA's Evmw opPsto wss inD NEw DRE-noNs iN EwvtRomrrAL~jorEnooN 15 (1990); The National Law
Journal, Feb. 18, 1991, at 1, col. 1.
I See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989) (states may be considered "persons"
subject to CERCLA liability); Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86 (3d Cir.
1988) (federal rule of decision should be applied to determine successor corporation liability); Penn Terra,
Ltd. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984) (suits brought to compel remedy of
environmental hazards are not stayed by Bankruptcy code); United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193
(E.D. Pa. 1989) (fashioned federal rule of decision for determining parent corporation liability under
CERCLA). See also 137 CoNG. Rrae. H1769 (daily ed. March 14, 1991) (statement of Rep. LaFalce).
IR. NASSBRO, CoORATE AND CoumrAwi FiN CNc AcGmR'wrs § 2.01 (1984).
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discretion with respect to the oversight of such debtors, ultimately protecting their
loans. CERCLA, however, has brought these "traditional" creditors' practices to
the epicenter of the collision between environmental and commercial law.
One recent court decision has further energized the debate over the extent to
which environmental liability discourages the exercise of traditional creditors'
practices. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp.,8 has triggered a flurry of activity by
every conceivable interest group. The lending industry, for the most part, rallies
around traditional creditors' practices to the exclusion of environmental liability.9
Environmentalists, not surprisingly, tout the virtue of a clean environment through
the extension of CERCLA liability to those parties-sometimes lenders--that play
a role in the creation, handling and disposal of hazardous waste. 10
This article will focus on whether there is a practical solution for reconciling
this clash between creditors' rights and environmental liability. In an effort to
provide a tangible basis for critical analysis, the following hypothetical situation will
be employed throughout this article. This hypothetical is intended to demonstrate
a generic two party loan situation. Although this model may be an oversimplifica-
tion, its basic assumptions adequately provide the basis for analysis.
In 1982, C makes a loan to D. D secures the loan with property on which D
operates a small electroplating facility. Although fairly successful in the past, D
begins to experience financial difficulties in 1986. C, fearful that D will default on
its debt, proposes and initiates a "workout agreement' '12 with D. Under the
agreement, C is allowed to (1) monitor D's financial transactions and (2) limit D's
expenditures. This arrangement continues until 1988, at which time D declares
bankruptcy. Later that year, C forecloses on its security interest and liquidates
portions of the equipment at the facility. In 1989, the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) enters D's property and discovers wide-spread contamination. Later
that year, EPA brings suit against C as a potentially responsible party (PRP),13 and
thus alleges that C is liable for the clean-up costs of the site under CERCLA."4
'See infra notes 16-23 and accompanying text.
8 901 F.2d 1550 (1lth Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991).
Los Angeles Times, October 7, 1991, at D2, col. 1; Atlanta Constitution, Aug. 2, 1990, at A18, col. 1.10Labaton, Business and the Law: Bank Liability for Toxic Sites, N.Y. Times, April 18, 1991, at D2, col. 3.
1' See infra notes 184-208 and accompanying text.
12 "Workout" agreements (also referred to as out-of-court settlements) are defined as follows:
There axe two types of out-of-court workouts. One type involves a moratorium pending
resolution of the debtor's difficulties through refinancing, a major sale, or infusion of investment
capital. The other type of out-of-court workout involves adjustment of indebtedness between the
debtor and its creditor....
D. CAMPBE.L, D.M. LYNN & S. YOuNGMAN, CREDrroR's RIGHTS HANDBOOK § 9.01 (1990). See also L. KiNG
& M. COOK, CREDrroRs' RiGHTs, DEBTORS' PROTECrION AND BANKRuFrrcy 542 (1985).
13 CERCLA § 107,42 U.S.C. § 9607.
14 Id.
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COMMON LAW DERIVATIVE LIABILrrY OF CREDrrORS
OUrSIDE TIE SCOPE OF ENvIRONMNTAL LAW
Prior to the emergence of environmental statutes, common law almost
exclusively defined appropriate practices with respect to debtors."5 What follows is
a review of (1) creditors' practices generally considered necessary and appropriate
in the area of commercial law and (2) activities which generally result in the
imposition of derivative liability upon creditors under common law. This overview
is intended to provide a rough model of the "traditional" lending community. As
such, it should present the basis for comparative analysis regarding the effects of
environmental liability on the lending industry. In short, what could creditors do in
the past without incurring derivative liability?
Traditional Creditors' Rights with Respect to Debtors
At the core of commercial law is the creditor's contractual ability to foreclose
on a delinquent loan and thereby collect the debtor's promised collateral. ' This right
is fundamental to the loan process; it facilitates loan-making through the assurance
that the collateral will, in the case of a default by the debtor, provide some measure
of monetary return to the lender. ' 7 Foreclosure, however, may not always be the ideal
solution for a situation in which a debtor faces financial hardship.' 8 Loan "workout
agreements"'19 may be more beneficial to both the debtor and the lender. Such
agreements can allow the debtor to continue business operations while bolstering the
likelihood that the creditor will receive a more complete return on its investment.2°
Foreclosure also imposes certain transactional costs on both parties, costs which
could hinder the creditor's opportunity to fully recoup its outlay.2'
For example, in the hypothetical situation outlined above, assume that D's
facility, if sold "as is," would not cover the amount loaned by C. C, therefore,
received a greater return on its investment by working with its troubled debtor from
1986 to 1988, than it would have had it foreclosed in 1986 and sold the collateral.
The debtor's collateral was worth more as an operational facility. Therefore, the
"workout agreement" ameliorated the inherent transactional costs unavoidably
linked to foreclosure, and ensured productivity which would have been lost had D
simply foreclosed on its loan.
"
1Lundgren, Liability of a Creditor in a Control Relationship with its Debtor, 67 MARQ. L. REv. 523 (1984).
16 1 P. Coo AN, W. HoGAN & D. VAUTS, SECuRED TRANSACTIONS UNDER Th UNwoRM CommEacAL CoDE
§ 1.04[3] (1985).
17Id.
I 8Burcat, Environmental Liability of Creditors: Open Season on Banks, Creditors, and other Deep Pockets,
103 BANxIo L.J. 509, 527 (1986).
19 1d.
2* Id. See also L. KiNG & I. CooK, supra note 12, at 541-42.
21 Burcat, supra note 18, at 528. See also L. KING & M. CooK, supra note 12, at 542.
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In light of these commercial practices, courts have allowed creditors to
undertake specific actions and controls aimed at protecting the obligation owed by
the debtor.? However, if the creditor becomes overly involved with the debtor's
affairs, courts may impose liability upon the creditor for the debtor's other
obligations. 23
Traditional Common Law Creditor's Liability
1. Instrumentality or "Alter Ego" Theory
Courts have held creditors liable under the alter ego or instrumentality theory
for all the debts owed by their debtor-that is, liability to the debtor's other
creditors.24 Although courts have not clearly defined the contours of this theory,
liability appears more likely to attach when a creditor "demands and assumes such
control over the entire spectrum of a debtor's business affairs that existing manage-
ment is supplanted and is reduced to carrying out the directions of the creditor."
Under this theory, however, courts seem less likely to impose liability on a creditor
for such activities as collecting all necessary information, requesting a negative veto
power over the debtor's financial transactions and providing assistance or counsel-
ing to the debtor.26
An excellent example of the latitude courts grant to creditors exercising control
over their debtor is provided by Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. Nat' l. Distillers & Chem.
Corp. 27 In Krivo, the plaintiffs, ten creditors of a certain debtor, sued the major
creditor, National Distillers & Chemical Corp. (National). The action was instituted
to recover money owed them by the debtor.2 8 The plaintiffs alleged that National was
liable because it controlled the debtor to such an extent that the debtor was a "mere
instrumentality" of National. 29
Prior to the debtor's default, National entered into an agreement with the
troubled debtor to "(1) provide internal financial management assistance to help [the
debtor] eliminate costly waste, (2) lend [the debtor] another $600,000 in cash, (3)
defer payments on the $630,000 accounts receivable, [and] (4) help [the debtor]
liquidate unprofitable holdings to provide more capital for [the debtor] .... 
Furthermore, in an effort to strengthen the debtor's financial management, National
' See Lundgren, supra note 15, at 527, 556.
'See id. at 523. See also Burcat, supra note 18, at 528; E. MANmNo, LENDRLAIry AND BANKNG DUSTRY§6.01 (1990).
u Lundgren, supra note 15, at 524 n.2.
25 Id. at 534.
Id. at 533.
27 483 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1973), reh'g denied, 490 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1974).
2 Id. at 1101.
291d.
30 ld. at 1108.
AKRON LAW REvEEw [Vol. 25:1
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sent an internal auditor to "oversee [the debtor's] finances an to establish control
procedures for managing cash and investments." 31 Although the internal auditor
worked with the debtor for fifteen months, the debtor eventually ceased operations. 32
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, following appeal of a directed
verdict for National, began its analysis by setting forth its principle of control
liability:
An examination of 'instrumentality' cases involving the creditor-debtor
relationship demonstrates that courts require a strong showing that the
creditor assumed actual, participatory, total control of the debtor.
Merely taking an active part in the management of the debtor corporation
does not automatically constitute control, as used in the instrumentality
doctrine, by the creditor corporation.33
Applying this principle, the court held that there was insufficient evidence to
establish a jury question with regard to the issue of control. It therefore affirmed the
trial court's grant of National's motion for directed verdict34
In short, the instrumentality theory of liability appears to apply to those
creditors who have made their control over the debtor so complete that the debtor is
merely a pawn in its own financial dealings.35
2. Liability Arising trom Agency Theory
Agency theory, also based on the degree of control exerted by a creditor, seems
to espouse a broader rule of creditor liability than that set forth by the alter ego
theory.3 It has been hypothesized that this easing of the instrumentality rule may
have occurred "in order to provide necessary protection for other creditors where a
position of control has been wrongfully abused.' '37 Regardless of the rationale
underlying this theory, as with the instrumentality theory; courts have declined to
establish a "bright line" test for improper exercise of control.38
A illustrative example of both this broader rule of liability and the uncertain
standard used by courts under the agency theory may be drawn from a comparison
of the results in Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc.3 9 and Buck v. Nash-Finch Co.4'
t Krivo, 483 F.2d at 1108.
32 d. at 1109.
33 1d. at 1105.
' Id. at 1114. See also Lundgren, supra note 15, at 532-33.
3s Lundgren, supra note 15, at 533-34.
36 1d. at 538.
37 d.
381 d. at 534-39.
39 309 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. 1981).
- 102 N.W.2d 84 (S.D. 1960).
LoAN WoRcoursSummer, 1991]
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In Jenson, the plaintiffs-creditors were owed $2,000,000 by the debtor.
Subsequently, the creditors brought suit against Cargill, Inc. (Cargill), claiming that
Cargill was a principal of the debtor and, therefore, jointly liable for the debtor's
outstanding financial obligations.41 Prior to the lawsuit, Cargill agreed--based on
years of financial interaction between Cargill and the debtor-to increase funding
to the debtor under certain conditions. 42 The debtor accepted these conditions and
Cargill received: (1) access to the debtor's records; (2) a right to prior approval of
the debtor's capital improvements in excess of $5,000; and (3) a right to prior
approval of both the debtor's declaration of dividends and the sale and purchase of
stock.43 Furthermore, Cargill made several recommendations to the debtor concern-
ing the operation of its business." After a series of additional financial transactions,
the debtor ceased operations.4
After reviewing the record, the Minnesota Supreme Court, held that Cargill,
"by its control and influence over [the debtor], became a principal with liability for
the transactions entered into it by its agent [the debtor]". 46
In contrast, the South Dakota Supreme Court, in Buck, reached the opposite
result despite similar facts. 47 The defendant Nash-Finch Co. (Nash), had loaned
money to the debtor, and as a result Nash (1) secured access to and dominion over
the debtor's financial records; (2) made recommendations with respect to the
debtor's operations; and (3) made strong suggestions regarding the debtor's employ-
ment of managerial staff.4" Like the Minnesota Supreme Court, the Buck court
"experienced no difficulty in discovering a basis in the evidence warranting a finding
of an assumption of control by Nash-Finch Company, and a yielding of and acting
under such control by [the debtor] in certain phases of his business. ' 49 However, the
court declined to impose liability upon Nash because the record failed to indicate
that Nash controlled the debtor's buying operations.50
Although the result in Buck is questionable, the reasoning underlying Jenson
and Buck demonstrate, at the very least, a greater willingness of courts to impose
liability upon participatory creditors under the agency theory of control liability.
Regardless of this broader application of liability, the extent of control exercised by
a participatory creditor must be relatively extensive before liability will attach under
the agency theory.5 2
41 Jenson, 309 N.W.2d at 290.
42 Id. at 289.
43 Id. at 288.
44Id. at 289.
45 Id
4Id. at 290.47 Buck, 102 N.W.2d at 85-91.
4 Id. at 85-86.49 Id. at 89-90.
SId. at 91.
s' See Lundgren, supra note 15, at 538.
'
2 See supra notes 43, 48, 50, and accompanying text.
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:1I
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In summary, common law creditor liability, under either the instrumentality
theory or the agency theory, hinges upon the extent of control that acreditor exercises
over the business affairs of its debtor. Although the courts have hesitated to establish
an absolute test for excessive control, it appears that most creditor practices, short
of complete control of the debtor, may be a permissible means of policing debt.
CERCLA'S LIABILITY SCHEME AND THE SECURED CREDITOR
The "Draconian" Statute
In an effort to remediate hazardous waste problems, CERCLA sets forth a
scheme of liability which is intended to place the burden of cleanup on those parties
responsible for the problem.53 Under section 107 of the Act, liability falls upon past
and present owners of a facility, generators of the hazardous waste, and those who
accept hazardous waste for transport to disposal facilities.5 Liability is strict, joint,
several and retroactive. 5
Many traditional common law principles have either succumbed to or been
altered by CERCLA's congressional "mandate." 56 For example, courts have con-
sistently held that liability under CERCLA, although not clearly indicated in the
statute, is strict, joint and several.57 Therefore, in situations where common law
causationis an issue, present owners of a facility have been subject to strict, although
arguably "absolute," liability.
New York v. Shore Realty Corp. 51 is the seminal case with respect to this
concept. The court in Shore Realty held that causation was not a fundamental
requirement for the purposes of liability under section 107(a)(1) of CERCLA. 59 The
court based its holding on"legislative history... [which] specifically rejected includ-
ing a causation requirement in section [107(a)(1)]."60 Furthermore, the Court
wished to avoid rendering superfluous CERCLA's affirmative defenses, which are
based on causation.61
" See, e.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 848 (W.D. Mo.
1984); United States v. South Carolina Resycling & Disposal, Inc., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1577, 1581
(D.S.C. 1984); S. Rep. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1980).
"42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
"See Charla & Parry, Mediation Services: Successes and Failures of Site-Specific Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 2 V.L. Erlvm. L.J. 89,91 (1991).
"See supra note 5.
See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 171-72 n.23 (4th Cit. 1988) (Congress endored
case law recognizing joint and several liability underCERCLA); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d
1032,1042 (2d Cir. 1985) (CERCLA liability is strict liability); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F.
Supp. 802, 808 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (CERCLA liability is joint and several).
759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985). See also United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
s9 Id. at 1044.
w Id.
61 Id.
LOAN WORKOUrsSummer, 1991]
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While now generally accepted as a permissible operation of CERCLA,
imposition of liability upon a land owner, absent a demonstration of any conduct
related to hazardous waste, is a departure from the general common law concept of
legal causation as a requisite for liability.62 As previously noted, courts use the term
"strict" liability as the standard set forth by CERCLA,while in practice, imposition
of liability is arguably "absolute"--nothing other than ownership must be shown to
impose liability.63 This deference to CERCLA's mandate clearly takes precedence
over the common law causation principle, thus curbing the application of a
conflicting principle in favor of the congressionally sanctioned alternative.6
The reach of CERCLA liability is not without exception, however.6 5 CER-
CLA's definition of "owner or operator" exempts "a person, who, withoutpartici-
pating in the management of a.. .facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to
protect his security interest in the ... facility.1'' The extent and application of this
"secured creditors exemption" has fanned the flames of controversy which rage with
respect to the imposition of environmental liability regardless of traditional com-
mercial practices.67
Superfund Case Law and Lender Liability
1. United States v. Mirabile
The first court to deal with CERCLA's secured creditor exemption focused its
analysis primarily upon the creditors' control of the debtor. In United States. v.
Mirabile,68 the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
granted summary judgment for two defendant creditors, but denied a third defendant
creditor's motion for summary judgement, pending further development of the
factual record. In ruling on the motions, the Court set forth a distinction between
management of the debtor's financial matters and management of the debtor's
"operational, production, or waste disposal activities." 70 The court noted that this
distinction is critical7' and thus, if imposed at all, liability would fall only upon
creditors who participate in the operational aspects of the debtor's facility.' The
court then narrowed this distinction by holding that only "day-to-day" involvement
'
2 F. LAWSON & B. M.AmuSn-s, I Tolrnous Ltmnuy FOR U ONT oNAL HA~m iN im CoMMoN LAW AND Thm
CiviL LAw 107 (1982).
' Absolute liability is defined as "Responsbility without fault or negligence. BLAcK's LAw DIcTIONARY 9
(6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added).
"See supra note 5.
CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b).
CERCLA § 101 (20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9602(20)(A).(emphasis added).
7 See infra notes 94-117, 123-66 and accompanying text.
,15 Envtl. L. Rep (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20992 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985).
"Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20994, 20997.
70 Id. at 20995.
71 Id.
2 Id.
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in such "operational" activities would constitute a basis for the imposition of
liability.7
3
In Mirabile, the United States filed suit against Anna and Thomas Mirabile,
the present owners of the contaminated site.74 Subsequently, the Mirabiles joined
American Bank and Trust (ABT), the Small Business Administration (SBA), and
Mellon Bank (Mellon) as third-party defendants. The Mirabiles asserted that the
actions of these creditors--each had provided financing to the previous operator of
the facility-also exposed them to CERCLA liability. 76
ABT had loaned money to the previous owner of the facility."1 The loan was
secured by a mortgage on the owner's real estate and equipment.78 When the debtor
defaulted, ABT foreclosed on the property and subsequently placed the high bid at
the foreclosure sale.79 ABT assigned the bid to the Mirabiles four months later. Prior
to assigning the bid and several months after operations at the site had ceased, ABT
"secured the buildings [at the site] against vandalism ... ,made inquiries as to the
approximate cost of disposal of various drums located on the property, and through
its loan officer... visited the property on various occasions for the purpose of
showing it to prospective buyers."'I
The court granted ABT's motion for summary judgment, indicating that
ABT's "involvement with the site present[ed] the most compelling case for the
granting of such a motion." 2 The court held that ABT's actions at the site were taken
to protect its security interest in the property, and were by no means a continuation
of its debtor's operations at the site.83 Therefore, the court concluded that ABT did
not take part in the "day-to-day" operational activities of the facility, and thus,
CERCLA's secured creditor exemption applied to ABT."
SBA's motion for summary judgment was also granted on the basis of the
secured creditor exemption.8 5 In 1979, SBA made a loan to the debtor which was
secured through a second mortgage and additional items of collateral.86 However,
SBA's agreement with the debtor, provided for SBA to supply management
73 Id. at 20096.
74 Id. at 20995.
"5 Id.
76 id.
7id. at 20096.
18Jd.
9Id.
0 Id.
31 id.
92 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
Id. at 20997.
Id. at 20996.
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assistance to its borrowers.87 The court concluded that SBA had never provided such
managerial assistance to the debtor and, more importantly, that "participation in
purely financial aspects of operation, of the sort which occurred here, is [not]
sufficient to bring the lender [SBA] within the scope of CERCLA liability." 88
The court denied Mellon's motion for summary judgment in favor of devel-
oping a more complete record. 9 Mellon's predecessor in interest, Girard Bank, lent
money to the debtor and then supplied one of its loan officers to serve on an advisory
board to the debtor.90 Following the debtor's bankruptcy, a second loan officer
closely monitored the debtor's activities. 91 Because the Mirabiles had presented
some grounds, slender as they may be, for imposing liability and "bearing in mind
that all doubts are to resolved in favor of that party opposing a motion for summary
judgment." The court concluded that Mellon's motion should be denied in favor
of developing a more complete record. 3
In short, all three creditors were protected from CERCLA liability if they could
demonstrate that their involvement with the site was purely financial, seemingly
regardless of the degree of that involvement. The Mirabile Court set forth a broad
formulation of CERCLA's secured creditor exemption.
2. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp.
United States v. Fleet Factors Corp.94 announced a new and narrower con-
struction of the secured creditor exemption. In 1976, Fleet Factors Corporation
(Fleet), entered into an agreement by which Fleet advanced funds to the debtor
against the assignment of the debtor's accounts receivable.95 The loan was secured
by the debtor's facility and all of its equipment, fixtures and inventory.96 Although
the debtor experienced financial difficulties and subsequently ceased operations in
1981, Fleet continued to collect the debtor's accounts receivable and substantially
increased its involvement with the debtor as it wound down its affairs.97
In 1982, after the debtor had been adjudicated a bankrupt, Fleet foreclosed on
some of the debtor's inventory and equipment. 9 Fleet then contracted with Baldwin
Industrial Liquidators (Baldwin) to auction off the debtor's collateral. 99 After the
87 Id.
88 Id. at 20997.
9 d.
9Id. at 20096.
91 Id.
92 Id.
9 Id.
- 901 F.2d 1550 (llth Cir. 1990).
95Id. at 1552.
9Id.
97d.
9Id.
" Id.
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auction was completed, Nix Riggers (Nix) was allegedly engaged by Fleet to remove
the remaining unsold collateral and to leave the premises "broom clean."'0 Nix
completed this work and left the site by the end of the 1983.101
In 1984, the EPA, discovered hazardous materials on the site, cleaned up the
site, and subsequently brought suit against Fleet to recover the clean-up costs."
Fleet filed a motion for summary judgment with the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Georgia. 3 The court denied Fleet's motion and certified
the summary judgment issue for interlocutory appeal to the Eleventh Circuit.'0
Fleet appealed. 0 5
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit thus became the
first federal appellate court to interpret the construction of the secured creditor
exemption.'" After addressing the parties' constructions of the exemption, the
Court "specifically reject[ed] the formulation of the... exemption suggested by the
district courtin Mirabile.1°7 Instead, the court adopted a narrow construction of the
statutory language and held that a secured creditor "may incur ... liability, without
being an operator,'0 ' by participating in the financial management of afacility to a
degree indicating a capacity to influence the corporation's [debtor's] treatment of
hazardous waste."09 The court concluded that it is not "necessary for the secured
creditor actually to involve itself in the day-to-day operations of the facility in order
to be liable-although such conduct [would] certainly lead to the loss of the
protection of the statutory exemption."" 0
The court further supported its ruling by asserting two assumptions. First, the
court stated in dicta that its ruling would encourage potential creditors to investigate
the environmental soundness of a potential debtor's waste systems and practices."'
100Id.
101 Id.Iom Id.
i3 d.
10Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
10 7ld. at 1558.
'RId. at 1557. The court explains in a footnote, however, that there is a distinction between operator liability
and liability imposed upon secured creditors which fall outside of the secured creditor exemption. Id. at
1156 n.6. The court stated that "Fleet is liable under the statute if it operated the facility within the meaning
of the statute. Alternatively, Fleet can be held liable if it had an indicia of ownership in [the debtor] and
managed the facility to the extent necessary to remove it from the secured creditors liability exemption."
Id. Without sufficiently differentiating between the culpable activities associated with operator liability
and unprotected creditor liability, the court leaves unanswered the issue of the minimum creditor
involvement necessary to fall outside the exemption. Some commentators believe that "sweeping pro-
nouncements regarding the secured creditor exemption" were unnecessary because the court indicated that
Fleet's particpation was clearly sufficient to impose operator liability. Bolstien&Rezik,.LenderLiability
After Fleet Factors, 10 A.B.A. STANDiNG CoM. ENvIL. L. No. 3 at 3 (1990).
-
0 9 Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1557 (emphasis added).
I1 ld. at 1557-58.
"I Id. at 1588.
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According to the court this would, allow creditors to weigh potential environmental
liability when fashioning a loan agreement. It would also encourage debtors,
sensitive to the effect of inadequate hazardous waste systems on the probability of
obtaining a loan, to "improve their handling of hazardous waste.' 12 Second, the
court asserted that the potential implication of CERCLA liability upon creditors
would "encourage [creditors] to monitor the hazardous waste treatment systems and
policies of their debtors and insist upon compliance with acceptable treatment
standards as a prerequisite to continued and future financial support."' 3 In short, the
court would "deputize" the lending industry as "quasi-EPA monitors.""14
Applying its formulation to Fleet's involvement with its debtor, the court held
that, if proved, Fleet's involvement with the debtor's affairs during the debtor's
winding down period prior to its 1981 cessation of operations, would be sufficient
to "remove Fleet from the protection of the secured creditor exemption."'15
In summary, the Fleet Factors court set forth a very narrow formulation of the
secured creditor exemption." 6 Under the court's holding, not only can a creditor be
liable forfinancial, rather than strictly operational management of a debtor, but also
that involvement need not actually effect the debtor's hazardous waste practice--a
capacity to effect such practices is sufficient. 117
112 Id.
113 Id.
'4 Note, Interpreting the Meaning of Lender Management Participation Under Section 101(20)(A) of
CERCLA, 98 YA LJ. 925, 931 (1989); Comment, The Impact of the 1986 Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act on the Commercial Lending Industry: A CriticalAssessment, 41 U. MAMI L Rnv. 879,
901 (1987).
,' Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1559. The government alleged that Fleet's activities included the following:
Fleet required [the debtor] to seek its approval before shipping its goods to customers,
established the price for excess inventory, dictated when and to whom the finished goods
should be shipped, determined when employees should be laid off, supervised the activity
of the office administrator at the site, received and processed [the debtor's] employment and
tax forms, controlled access to the facility, and contracted with Baldwin to dispose of the
fixtures and equipment at [the site].
Id.
6 Id. at 1557.
'"Id. Subsequently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has handed down the first post-
Fleet Factors decision concerning the secured creditor exemption. Bergsoe Metal Corp. v. East Asiatic Co..
910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990). In its decision, the Bergsoe court, although citing the Fleet Factors case,
demurred on adopting the Eleventh Circuit's formulation of the exemption and instead focused its
construction on the creditor's actual participation with the management of the debtor's operations. Id. at
672.
Bergsoe involved a series of complex financial arrangements. Id. at 669-70. In essence, the St.
Helens Port Authority (Port) gave land to the Bergsoe Metal Corporation (Bergsoe) in exchange for a
security interest which included a mortgage on the property. Id. Bergsoe built a recycling plant on the site
which opened in 1982. Id. at 670. The plant suffered financial problems from its beginning. Through a
workout agreement-arrangement by Bergsoe and another financial institution involved in the complex
landscape under lying the operation-the Port agreed to allow a third party to manage the facility in lieu of
foreclosing on its security interest. Id. Nevertheless, the plant failed and subsequently shut down in 1986.
Id. After Bergsoe was forced into involuntary bankruptcy, the Oregon Department of Environmental
Quality determined that contamination casued by hazardous substances occurred at the site. Id. An action
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The Ambiguities of Superfund: The Present State of the Law
CERCLA was a hastily drafted statute, and as such its language is at times,
ambiguous."' However, many courts have endeavored to clarify some of these
ambiguities. 119 Their opinions have often resulted in a flurry of critical commentary,
and the Eleventh Circuit's Fleet Factors opinion is no exception. 1 The court took
an ambiguous phrase and fashioned its own construction of the secured creditor
exemption. ' 2
The purpose of this article, however, is not to critique the Fleet Factors
Court. 12 Instead, barring drastic changes in the law or the courts, this article accepts
the Fleet Factors decision as the present state of the law with respect to lender
liability under CERCLA. Therefore, this article, given the present state of the law,
will seek to elucidate the following: (1) what is the effect of Fleet Factors on the
lending industry?; and (2) is there a viable solution to the unrest created by this
impact?
was subsequently filed by Bergsoe's trustee in bankruptcy against East Asiatic Company. Ltd., East Asiatic
Company, Inc., and Heidelberg Eastern, Inc. (collectively EAC), the owners of Bergsoe stock, requesting
a declaration that EAC should be liable for the costs of cleaning up the environmental contamination. Id.
The defendants filed a third party complaint alleging that the Port was liable, as owner, for clean up costs
under CERCLA. Id. The Port moved for summary judgment on the grounds that it was not an "owner" for
the purposes of CERCLA liability. Id. The bankruptcy court granted the motion and the district court
affirmed. Id. Appeal was brought by EAC. Id.
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by citing Fleet Factors for the proposition that "CERCLA. ...
protects secured creditors who do not participate in the management of the facility." Id. at 671. The court
held that the exemption applied to the Port if it could meet a two pronged test: (1) that Port holds indicia of
ownership primarily to protect its security interest in the Bergsoe plant; and (2) that Port did not participate
in the management of the facility. Id. at 671-72. After determining that the Port did hold indicia of
ownership as a security interest, the court held that the Port had not involved itself in the actual management
of the Bergsoe facility and therefore escaped liability through the secured creditor exemption. d.
In reaching its holding, the court explicitly stated that it wished to "leave for another day the
establishment of a Ninth Circuit rule on this difficult issue." Id. at 672. Instead, the court held that "there
must be some actual management of the facility before a secured creditor creditor will fall outside the
exemption." Id. Therefore, because Port had not engaged in the actual management of the facility, the court
did not feel compelled to reach the interpretational issue with respect to the secured creditor exemption.
However, as the first post-Fleet Factors federal appellate decision, it indicates, although not explicitly, a
possible move away from the Elventh Circuit's formulation of the exemption.
In short, the Ninth Circuit indiated a willingness to ameliorate the effect on lenders of Fleet Factors.
According to the court's holding, whether establishing a rule or not, secured creditors, at least in a situation
similar to the one in Bergsoe, must participate in some actual management of the facility before the
proection afforded by the exemption is lost.
"' See Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1572 (5th Cir. 1988);
Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle County, 659 F. Supp. 1269,1277 (D. Del. 1987); United States v. Price,
577 F. Supp. 1103, 1109 (D.N.J. 1983).
"
9 See supra note 5.
See infra note 122.
21 See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
" See Note, Cleaning Up the Debris After Fleet Factors: Lender Liability and CERCLA's Security Interest
Exemption, 104 HRV. L REv. 1249,1263 (1991); Comment, LimitingLiability ofthe Passive Lender Under
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 26 TuLsA LJ. 75,
93 (1990). 13
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LENDER LIABILITY AND ITs PERCEIvED
REALmTs: THE SKY Is FALLING - No IT's NOT
The lending industry is upset. Some industry leaders warn "that environmental
problems buried deep in the books of ailing banks and thrifts could weaken the
nation's beleaguered financial institutions. '123 These leaders also warn that "they
could be forced to stop making loans to real estate developers and business owners
if they can be held responsible for cleaning up the property they did not pollute."''T
Concerns have also been expressed by the federal government. The Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC)
have inherited a number of failed banks and thrifts which hold contaminated
properties and therefore could face potential Superfund liability.11 "FDIC
officials... have said that contamination problems have been found at 270 prop-
erties their agency holds and that cleanup costs for [fifty] of those properties may be
as much as three times their market value.' '""
At least one commentator has expressed the extreme view that "the U.S. is
poised for its first regulatory recession, prompted chiefly by environmental judg-
ments that expose many financial institutions to bankruptcy because of liabilities
associated with previous lending."12 7
A privately conducted study, which utilized an EPA database, suggests that the
lending industry may be overstating the potential fallout from the imposition of
CERCLA liability upon certain creditorsTM The study states that "[1]enders
comprise 0.23% of PRPs---40 of 17,095-in the [EPA's] database." 29 The thirty
individual lenders who have been named as PRPs represent "one-tenth of one
percent of the nation's more than 30,000 commercial banks, S&Ls and credit
unions."" "Altogether, lenders are PRPs at [twenty-seven] separate sites, 2.24
percent of the total 1207 sites on EPA's National Priorities List."' 3' Of these PRPs,
"only seven lenders have paid EPA anything for Superfund site cleanup" and "[a]ll
but two have paid less than $8,100.1' 32
Although these figures indicate that lenders have been relatively unaffected by
CERCLA liability, there is no indication that this trend will continue in the post-
" Philadelphia Inquirer, April 11, 1991, § A, col. 1-4.
124 Id.
12
5 Id.
126 Id.
127 Soun-iRN FIANcE, PRoincr, CRYING WoLF: LENDR LmiLTY AT SuPEiwuNiD Srrns 1 (1990) [hereinafter
SFP. See also Comment, supra note 114, at 900-01.
" See SFP, supra note 127.
'
2 9 d. at 7.
130 Id. at 8.
131 Id.
"
2 SFP, supra note 127, at 10. The average contribution paid by the seven PRPs was $95,997.73. Id.
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Fleet Factors era. 3 Therefore, the relative weight which should be accorded to
these figures is uncertain. 134
The rhetoric generated by the lender liability issue has been polar, and less than
a modicum of clarity. 3 s This divergence of views has, as a practical matter, clouded
the issue and has impeded systematic attempts at obtaining a viable solution.'3
THE ROLE OF CREDITORS WITH RESPECT TO THEIR DEBTORS:
THE POST FLEET FACTORS NEW LEGAL ORDER?
Fleet Factors' Assumptions and Their Possible Effect
on the Lending Industry
Of the handful of courts which have dealt with the secured creditor exemption,
arguably the Fleet Factors court is the only court to give environmental liability clear
priority over established commercial practices.'37 Accordingly, this places the Fleet
Factors holding and its dicta at the center of critical commentary.131 The Fleet
Factors court, in taking a unique path, explicitly outlined the effects that it intended
its opinion to have: (1) to encourage lenders to investigate potential environmental
liability prior to executing loan agreements, and thereby compel potential debtors
seeking favorable loan terms to maintain adequate hazardous waste practices; 39 and
(2) to encourage lenders, after making a loan, to monitor debtors' hazardous waste
practices in an effort to minimize the lenders' potential liability.140
The incentives created by the threat of potential liability, although essentially
new to the interplay between environmental and commercial law, do find some
support in Congress' expansive commitment to maintaining a safe and clean
environment.'14 In enacting CERCLA, Congress stated that its overriding purpose
was to remediate hazardous waste contamination. 42 The costs generated by this
beneficial program were intended to be borne by the parties having some involve-
ment in the creation of the pollution problem: "the polluter should pay." 43 Although
33 The information analyzed in the report represents data through mid-August 1990. Id. at 11. Therefore,
the data reflects a relatively small time lapse between the Fleet Factors decision (May 23, 1990) and the
compilation of the data. The effect of Fleet Factors may take longer than three months to be felt.
134Id.
"S See supra notes 123-34.
136 Id.
137 Cf. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20096.
13 See supra note 122.
'39 Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1558.
140 Id.
141 See S. Rep. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1980) (CERCLA's purpose is to assure "that those who
benefit financially from a commercial activity internalize the health and environmental costs of that activity
into the costs of doing business").
42 MR. Rep. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 62, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADmiN. NEws 6119,
6139 (statement of Albert Gore, Jr.).
143 See, e.g., United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1553 (1lth cir. 1990); United States v.
Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615,622 (D.N.H. 1988). 15
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this proposition is generally accepted, the extent of its reach to those indirectly
related to hazardous waste management is, as previously indicated, the source of
ongoing debate. 1"
Inherent in this debate are the costs and benefits of compelling lenders to
change their conduct with respect to their debtors. Many pro-lender advocates
profess that imposing CERCLA liability upon creditors casts a forbidding shadow
on not only the lending industry but also, and rather apocalyptically, over the entire
economy.145 Some assert that compelled monitoring by lenders will increase trans-
action costs, ultimately causing interest rates to rise.'" Others predict that
imposition of environmental liability upon creditors will lead to an increase in loan
failures due to lender's increasing willingness to allow loans with potential
environmental liability to go uncollected. 4 7 In light of the recent economic turmoil
surrounding the savings and loan bailout, any further indication of failed loans seems
to trigger a chorus of pessimism and voices of doom.'" Realistically, regardless of
the alarmist tone, increased imposition of CERCLA liability upon creditors could
have an adverse effect on the lending industry with some residual effect on the
overall economy.14 9
In response to these assertions, environmental advocates indicate that impo-
sition of CERCLA liability upon "participatory" creditors benefits society as a
whole by imposing the risk of liability upon those parties-in this case lenders-
which are best able to spread the costs.15 Historically loan making has not been
curbed by the increasing complexity and potential pitfalls inherent in our modem
economy.' 5' There is no indication that overall lending will diminish; however,
creditors' practices will most likely change to accommodate the added layer of
complexity.5" Lenders already possess a highly integrated network of sophisticated
monitoring services. 53 The addition of one more variable, environmental compli-
ance, could be done efficiently and at relatively low cost.A Furthermore, the
prediction of widespread liability and its increased cost to the economy seems, at
present, to be unsubstantiated. 55 Assuming that there is a direct correlation between
'" See supra notes 123-36.
'4" See supra notes 123-27.
See Comment, supra note 114, at 900.
'
47 Philadelphia Inquirer, April 11, 1991, § A, col. 1.
'"See supra notes 123-27.
149 d.
ISO See Note, supra note 114, at 932.
' See, e.g., Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Setting, 92 YAIn L.J. 49, 51
(1982).
1-2 See, e.g., H. Gun*AANN & H. DouGAiL, CORPORATE FINANCL POucy 3-4 (1955); W. HUsBnAN & J. DocK-
Ey, MODERN CoRpoaArm FiNANcE 3 (1946).
I" See Levmore, supra note 151, at 50-55.
11 See,e.g., Note, supra note 114, at 931-33; EPA Proposal to limitLiability ofFinancial Institutions Under
(ERCLA, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) 430,433 & 436 (June 14, 1991).
"' See supra notes 128-34 and accompanying text.
AKRON LAW REVEEw (Vol. 25:1
16
Akron Law Review, Vol. 25 [1992], Iss. 1, Art. 6
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol25/iss1/6
the actual numberof creditorPRPs, which is relatively small, 'm and the overall effect
on the economy, there appears to be little foundation for implicating an impending
economic crisis. 1 7
Any change in the status quo reasonably leads to the development of
competing interests and arguments.158 Changing the role of creditors with respect
to their debtors is no exception. 59 However, an evaluation of the polar views
advanced by the competing interests seems to indicate that encouraging creditors to
change their behavior is beneficial to the whole society, while the dire predictions
espoused by the lending industry are, at best, a response to the lack of more tangible
guidance and, quite possibly, the lending industry's latent attempt to operate in a
"risk free" environment.16°
The Contrast Between Fleet Factors and Common Law
Derivative Liability of Creditors
As previously noted, at common law, creditors are traditionally permitted
some degree of control over their debtors.' 6' The extent of this allowable participa-
tion in the common law context, while nebulous, is patently more extensive than the
Fleet Factors formulation of CERCLA's secured creditor exemption. 62 Therein
lies the nib.
Generally accepted common law principles applicable to commercial transac-
tions are completely eviscerated when environmental liability under Fleet Factors
becomes an issue. 63 Common law principles, predicated on the extent of control
exercised by a creditor, grant a creditor a great deal of latitude before liability
attaches.1 ' Fleet Factors erodes this latitude by imposing liability upon creditors
who "participate in the financial management of a facility to a degree indicating a
capacity to influence the [debtor's] treatment of hazardous waste." Creditors under
common law could actively protect their loans up to a point close to complete control
of the debtor. Under Fleet Factors, however, the threshold for liability is lowered
below active participation, regardless of its extent, to the mere potential of culpable
behavior. This disparity in legal standards, in conjunction with the potential for
adverse economic consequences, necessitates the need for a viable reconciliation of
the myriad of competing interests spawned by the lender liability issue.
156 Id.
1I57Id.
M See infra notes 161-66 and accompanying text.
159 Id.
'60 See Note, supra note 114, at 931; Atlanta Constitution, Aug. 2, 1990, at AI8, col. 2.
'61 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
"2 See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
163Id.
'" See supra notes 24-52 and accompanying text.
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PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Exempt Lenders Completely
One proposed solution to the clash between traditional creditors' practices and
environmental liability is to completely exclude secured creditors from potential
CERCLA strict liability. 6 This solution would allow creditors to freely police
loans under the traditional confines dictated by the common law and would without
a doubt appease pro-lender constituencies. 16 However, this solution is arguably
inappropriate. Lenders that regulate their debtors can, with such a free hand, allow
hazardous waste problems to continue or to happen.'19 When a debtor faces financial
hardship, it is not unthinkable that a creditor, working with the troubled debtor, could
in an effort to reduce expenditures, reduce or eliminate funding for expensive
disposal measures. 170 To sanction such a potential situation is inconsistent with
CERCLA's mandate: "the polluter should pay." 17'
The effect of this solution can be seen in the ongoing hypothetical. Assume
that C, during the period of D's financial troubles, provides financial advice to D
which affects D's disposal of hazardous waste. C, subject to a complete exemption
from liability, could indirectly instruct D to reduce or eliminate costs connected with
hazardous waste treatment and disposal in an effort to assure a greater probability
of return on its outlay. It is obvious under this scenario that both C and D would save
money by cutting disposal costs. It is equally obvious that such a measure could
result in the increased risk of environmental contamination. In short, absent the
threat of liability, cutting costs to save a troubled loan may eliminate any compelling
reason to spend capital on hazardous waste disposal.
Judicial Provisions Which Clearly Define Inappropriate Creditor
Involvement: A CommonLaw "Bright Line"
This approach is problematic. Several Courts have attempted to provide
creditors with a simple definition of inappropriate creditors' behavior. 72 As
previously noted, a recent variation of this proposed solution was set forth in the
Fleet Factors decision. The Fleet Factors court, not unlike other courts, announced
a standard which ultimately, and not surprisingly, hinges on semantics. 17 The court
" Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1557 (emphasis added).
'"See supra notes 24-52 and accompanying text.
" See, e.g., S. 651,102d Cong., 1 st Sess., 137 CoNG. Rac. S3457-01 (daily ed. March 14, 1991); Comment,
supra note 122, at 95.
'Id. See supra notes 24-52.
'"See Note, supra note 114, at 931.
"
0 See id.
171 See supra note 3.
" See Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20096 (creditor must participate in the "day-to-day"
operation activities of a facility before secured creditor exemption is forfeited).
7 Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1557.
[Vol. 25:1
18
Akron Law Review, Vol. 25 [1992], Iss. 1, Art. 6
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol25/iss1/6
announced that under its standard "a secured creditor may incur... liability.., by
participating in the financial management of a facility to a degree indicating a
capacity to influence the [debtor's] treatment of hazardous waste."174 What is
troublesome about this standard, and arguably other similar standards, is that it fails
to adequately define its operative terms. What does "degree indicating a capacity to
influence" mean in a practical sense? 175 Although, a flexible standard may address
the realities of the commercial marketplace, 176 it is questionable whether judicial
formulation and application of such a standard is efficacious." Such formulations
invite case-by-case adjudication, and thus could fail to provide creditors with helpful
guidance. 7 8
Conversely, a discrete judicial standard would fail to address the diverse
practices inherent in commercial transactions. 17 9  A strictly defined standard,
although providing some measure of predictability, would likely curb certain
legitimate commercial practices.
These points may be clarified through the use of the ongoing hypothetical.
Assume that the Fleet Factor language applied to C's situation. Without a clear
definition of "capacity to influence."'" C may choose not to offer any financial
advice to its troubled debtor. This could result in an eventual default by D which is
detrimental to C and possibly, if repeated a substantial number of times, to the
economy itself. If C chooses to offer financial advice to D, C may be found liable
under the Fleet Factors standard.
In the alternative, assume, that "capacity to influence"'82 was further defined,
in the extreme case, to explicitly include financial advice. Prudently, C would not
offer D financial advice. This would effectively foreclose C and D from formulating
any type of flexible "workout' ' 3 agreement and thus eliminate a valuable commer-
cial tool.
A Middle Ground: Case-by-case Analysis with the Option
of De Minimis Settlement
To the discomfort of many lenders, a first step toward reaching an adequate
I74 ld. (emphasis added).
Does this capacity include the amount of money the creditor has invested? Or does it focus primarily on
the participation of the creditor in the financial affiars of the debtor?
'
76 See supra notes 16-23 and accompanying text.
' See, e.g., Fuller, Adjudication and the Rule of Law, 1960 Ppoc. AmoR. Soc. INT'L 1-8.
17' See Note, supra note 114, at 930-31.
"' See supra notes 16-23 and accompanying text. The same argument may be made against a congressional
standard.
180 d.
181 Fleel factors, 901 F.2d at 1557.
122 Id.
' See supra note 12.
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solution to this conflict would be to analyze each situation on a case-by-case basis.
Although cases may have some similarities, each case is inherently fact sensitive.lu
The control exercised by each creditor varies as to the particular debtor, its financial
standing, and an array of other market forces. 85 Because of the unique nature of
every loan situation, any mechanism constructed to cope with this diversity must be
flexible. 86 A rigid mechanical standard would fail to address the realities of the loan
market. 187
Although not at first apparent, this need for flexibility does lend itself to a
potential statutory solution. Liability is the threshold analysis under CERCLA;
however, the extent of such liability may be ameliorated."8 Section 122 of
CERCLA authorizes the President, through EPA, to enter into settlement agree-
ments with PRPs under certain circumstances.8 9 These agreements are beneficial
to aPRP for two reasons: (1) a settlement agreement allows the PRP to fix the amount
of liability it faces; 9° and (2) settlement shields the PRP from contribution suits
brought by other PRPs.191 Section 122 also allows expedited settlement with de
minimis parties. 192 The section lists a set of relevant factors to be used in determining
de minimis status.183 These factors create a flexible mechanism which can accom-
modate a diverse group of PRPs. 194
' See, e.g., United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (1 1th cir. 1990); Bergsoe Metal Corp. v.
East Asiatic Co., 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep (Envtl. L. Inst.)
20992 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985); Krivo Industrial Supply Co. v. National Distillers & Chemical Corp., 483
F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1973); A. Gay Jenson Famrs Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 NW. 2d 285 (Minn. 1981); Buck
v. Nash-Finch Co., 102 N.W.2d 84 (S.D. 1960).
18 See supra notes 16-23 and accompanying text.
'
9 6 Id. See also supra notes 24-52.187 Id.
8 CERCLA §107(b), 113(f), 122,42 U.S.C. §§9607(b), 9613(f), 9622.
1
-1d. § 122, 42 U.S.C. § 9622(a). This section states the following conditions:
Whenever practicable and in the public interest, as determined by the President, the
President shall act ot facilitate agreements under this section that are in the public interest
and consistent with the National Contingency Plan in order to expedite effective remedial
actions and minimize litigation.
Id.
190Id.
191 Id. § 2113(0(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(2).
1- CERCLA § 122(g), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g).
I" d. This section states in pertinent part:
Whenever practicable and in the public interest.. .the President shall... reach final settle-
ment with a potentially responsible party. . .if such settlment involves only a minor portion
of the response costs at the facility concerned and.. .the conditions in.. .the
following... are met:
(A) Both of the following are minimal in comparison to other hazardous sub
stances at the facility:
(i) The amount of the hazardous substances contributed by that party to
the facility.
(ii) The toxic or other hazardous effects of the substances contributed by
that party to the facility....
I" Id. See also note 197, infra.
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A "workable" statutory solution based on this existing mechanism would
appear to be completely reasonable. Amending section 122 to explicitly allow
settlement with secured creditors seems feasible and possibly desirable. The use of
factors based on the realities of commercial practices as the operative language of
the amendment would create a flexible mechanism more suited to the diversity of
the loan market. 95 Additional flexibility would be supplied by the courts and
EPA.196 The courts and EPA have dealt with analogous standards under CERCLA
and, therefore, possess a certain degree of sophistication with respect to the appli-
cation of CERCLA on a case-by-case basis.197
'95 See supra notes 16-23 and accompanying text.
'" EPA has entered the fray. In late Spring 1991, shortly after the Fleet Factors decision, EPA made public
its proposed solution to the lender liability conundrum. See EPA Proposal to Limit Liability of Financial
Instituions Under CERCLA, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) 430 (June 14, 1991). The proposed rule would allow a
lender to remain within the secured creditor exemption, if that lender-in the context of a loan workout-
undertakes actions that are both structured to protect... the security interest ... [and] are taken ... when
the security holder is assisting the borrower in an effort to prevent default of the loan or diminution of the
value of the security." Id. at 436-37. Pursuant to this paradigm, EPA would consider the following activities
permissible in the course of protecting a security interest: "restructuring or renegotiation of the terms of the
loan obligation, requiring payment of additional interest, extension of thepayment period, specificfinancial
or operational advice, suggestions, counselling, guidance or any other action reasonably necessary to
protect the security interest." Id. at 437 (emphasis added). A lender, however, will fall outside the
exemption and face potential liability for "participating" in the management of a facility "if [the lender's]
actions contribute to the contamination at a facility." d. (emphasis added).
Taken as a whole, this proposed rule strives to strike a balance between traditional commercial
practices and environmental liability. Id. at 433 & 436. The proposed rule does cut both ways, however.
It does endeavor to curb the harsh effects of the Fleet Factors decision by granting lenders a wide range of
permissible activities undertaken to protect a security interest. Unfortunately, the rule fails to adequately
define impermissible activities: what actions rise to the level of"contribut[ing] to the contamination at a
facility"? If the nexus between the creditor's action and the corresponding result is given broad application,
the resulting latitude granted to creditors would be quite narrow. It is not inconceivable that a financial
restructuring, no matter how small, could have a residual effect on the debtor's disposal practices; therefore,
under a "loose nexus" approach, minimal residual effects could result in lender liability. This does not
appear to be EPA's intention. Under the proposed rule, EPA states, "[w]hile a security holder does not
'participate[e] in the management' of a facility... merely because it causes or contributes to hazardous
substance contamination, in general a security holder must be cautious that its own actions do not result in
independent liability under CERCLA. Id. at 437 (emphasis added). On its face, this caveat does not appear
to implicate a loose nexus between the creditor's actions and the resulting effects; therefore, some latitude
on the part of a creditor appears to be available-but how much? Again, this raises the specter of indirect
control of the debtor's disposal practices. In short, controlling the purse strings could ultimately affect
environmental complaince. See supra notes 169-71 and accompaning text.
Further, the rule does not guarantee a finality which would be established by a statutory process. See
supra notes 190-93 and accompanying text. Under the proposed rule, EPA is the final arbiter, EPA decides
whether to take action against certain PRPs. This rule does not, however, foreclose third parties from
exercising their existing statutory right to bring contribution actions against others, potentially lenders, that
they believe are also responsible parties. CERCLA § 113 (f), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f). In short, the rule only
voices EPA's interpretation of lender liability.
Although EPA's proposed rule does contain certain inadequacies, it does reflect a willingness on the
part of EPA to approach debtor/creditor situations in a flexible manner cognizant of commercial lending
practices. EPA's recognition of these competing interests, placed in the context of a statutory amendment,
could be highly beneficial to the resolution of competing commercial practices and environmental
concerns.
"'See, e.g., United States v. Rohn & Haas Co., 30 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1520 (D.N.J. 1989); United States
v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 30 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1675 (D. Mass. 1989); Simandle, Resolving Multi-Party
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Such an amendment could allow creditors to take a more traditional approach
to their involvement with a debtor.19 Under this scheme, the extent of a creditor's
control over its debtor would be measured by standards cognizant of the financially
beneficial aspects of control, while at the same time serving to safeguard environ-
mental concerns. 199 It is a matter of degree. Although a participatory lender faces
the possible imposition of liability, settlement as a de minimis party, under the
proposed amendment, would be appropriate if the creditor's activities with respect
to the debtor contributed little to the overall contamination of the site."
The benefits of such an amendment are numerous. First, it is based upon a
preexisting statutory scheme.201 This allows for greater efficiency because both the
courts and enforcement agencies have already developed a sophistication with
respect to the settlement process.' Second, the amendment would provide greater
protection for the environment than would a complete exemption which would have
to rely primarily on the lending industry's self-constraint. 2°3 Third, the scheme
created by the amendment would provide the lending industry with a tangible,
although relatively flexible, standard.' Fourth, lenders would still be compelled
to monitor their debtors, and the threat of liability would still exist; however, the
extent of that liability would be contingent on the impact of the creditor's activi-
ties."° Finally and importantly, such an amendment could be the vehicle for the rec-
onciliation of traditional creditors' practices with the tenets of environmental
liability.20
Although the settlement process is basically structured for a case-by-case
approach, the use of the ongoing hypothetical is helpful in demonstrating the advan-
tages of a statutory settlement provision. Assume that C, during the period of D's
financial troubles, again provides financial advice which affects D's disposal of
hazardous waste. Under the proposed amendment to CERCLA, which would
explicitly provide for settlement with creditors based on equitable factors, C's
actions in protection of its loans could be balanced against the overall environmental
impact of those actions. If the resulting impact was small, then the EPA would be
empowered to settle with this de minimis party. However, if the impact was great,
then the creditor would be exposed to full CERCLA liability.
Hazardous Waste Litigation, 2. Vnii. ENVnL. L.J. 111 (1991); Superfund: De Minimis Settlements Hard to
Obtain, EPA Officials Complain, Citing PRP Dealys, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1147 (Oct. 12, 1990).t9 See supra notes 24-52.
See supra note 193.
2WId.20 1CERCA § 122(g), 42 U.S.C. §9622(g).
m See supra notes 196-197.
20 See supra notes 167-71.
''4See supra, notes 196-197.
1, See supra notes 154 and 196-97.
' See supra notes 123-66.
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Therefore, assume that C's activities with respect to D have little environ-
mental effect. C would now have the option to "cash out" of the litigation for a fixed
and relatively small amount.2 Further, C, through de minimis settlement, would
foreclose the possibility of contribution suits and thereby add additional predictabil-
ity to the settlement process. However, if C's actions were to have a more significant
environmental impact, then the de minimis settlement settlement option would not
be available. C would be left to use other approaches."
CONCLUSION
On its march toward a cleaner environment, CERCLA has periodically laid
waste to conflicting common law principles. Traditional commercial practices with
respect to debtors are no an exception. The Fleet Factors decision, if nothing else,
energized the debate over the impact of imposing CERCLA liability upon partici-
patory creditors. The impact of Fleet Factors on the legal, lending and economic
communities is presently in its infancy. Speculation abounds on all fronts, and at
times verges on hyperbole.
From this morass, however, a viable solution--capable of effectively balanc-
ing the diverse interests generated by this issue-is conceivable. An amendment to
CERCLA explicitly allowing secured creditors to settle as de minimis parties would
be an efficient, flexible and "environmentally friendly" solution to the lender
liability issue.
Would this approach be acceptable to both the lending industry and environ-
mental groups? This question is left open to the ongoing debate. However, in light
of the present state of lender liability under Superfund, a step towards compromise
cannot be dismissed lightly.
21 C could, however, still opt to pursue the secured creditors exemption.
= Id.
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